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Bjørn Ramberg asks his readers to, ‘try to be guided, as you construe me, by 
what is my central concern. And please don’t impose on my words your semantic 
ready-mades, your fast-thoughts, your blocking responses’ (p. 141). An excellent 
piece of advice, and one which I had no trouble following, given that I could 
readily see his central concern, and completely agreed (no qualifications) with his 
interpretation of my book. Had the latter not been the case, the advice would have 
been harder to follow; but more valuable. For when reading something in 
philosophy with which you are instinctively inclined to disagree, especially when 
your own views are being targeted, there is little point responding unless you try 
to see where the other is coming from; their central concern, motivating them to 
look for gaps and weaknesses. There is little point, because if you just throw out 
your ‘blocking responses’, you will neither learn from the encounter, nor have 
much chance of persuading your interlocutor; or others with the same kind of 
central concern. We all have our philosophical instincts, but unless we make the 
effort to empathise with others, our own will become inflexible, making it harder 
to reassure ourselves they are rational. Philosophy of mind provides my favourite 
example, where some philosophers today think their opponents are mad – well, 
perhaps they do not really think that, but they do like to suggest that it is the only 
reasonable conclusion to draw. This is frustration, and hampers the prospects for 
constructive engagement. They are probably right that the ‘mad’ philosophers will 
not be persuaded; neither will they. But others less entrenched in the debate might 
have been, if they had looked for the kind of central concern which might lead 
someone to write mad-sounding things, thinking them sensible.    
Ramberg’s central concern in his paper, I think, is to discover the central 
concern of my book. He sees all of these interlocking themes, concerning nihilism, 
transcendence, consciousness, and the autonomy of philosophy, and he wonders 
what is driving them. More specifically, he wonders if it is a central concern which 
he himself is on-board with; one concerning intellectual freedom. Basically, he 
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wonders if we have the same kind of central concern. I think we do.  
To give Ramberg’s advice a twist, however, I will start trying to illuminate 
this matter by throwing out just one of my ‘semantic ready-mades’ – the only one 
that even tempted me when I read his paper. I do not equate science with objective 
thought. When I instinctively make sense of the room around me in terms of 
physical objects in spatial relationships to each other, I am employing objective 
thought; but there is nothing remotely scientific about it. It is a natural way of 
thinking. Science is a development of that natural way of thinking; the best we 
have or are ever liable to get. Quine liked to say that science is a development of 
common sense, and to this extent, he was right. But we have another way of 
thinking, which arises equally naturally, albeit only explicitly within a more 
limited set of circumstances, and which has been a principle focus of all the great 
philosophical traditions. This is subjective thought. When we cannot readily think 
of what we are aware of as something in the physical world, as when we feel a 
sudden rush of enthusiasm, or see a blind spot of shimmering mercury while 
suffering from a migraine, then we think of it as experience. Just as science is our 
most sophisticated extension of objective thought, philosophy is our most 
sophisticated extension of subjective thought; for it is only with the latter, in 
conjunction with the former, that we can try to make sense of distinctively human 
concerns such as freedom. 
Now in Meaningless, I argued that subjective thought is parasitic upon 
objective thought. Many philosophers within what I think of as the broadly idealist 
tradition, past and present, have instead seen subjective thought as a kind of rival 
to objective thought, or else as something which shows an inadequacy in it; as if 
objective thinking needed to either catch up or fail. I share what I think is their 
central concern, these days at least, namely with the imperialistic ambitions of the 
scientific extension of objective thought, represented within academic philosophy 
under the heading ‘physicalism’ – or ‘naturalism’, when the emphasis is on 
epistemology rather than metaphysics. But I think an overly trusting attitude to 
subjective thought provides a weak basis for trying to do something positive about 
that concern. For as soon as you try to say something on its basis, the substance 
slips away, leaving you with only threadbare appeals to ineffability and a desire 
to say inarticulate things like, ‘you know what I mean … that particular feeling 
of pain, or the particular blueness, not of the sky, but of your experience.’  
The substance returns when you realise that whenever you try to think about 
things both substantively and subjectively, you must lean on objective thought; 
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but that where objective thought really does leave you short is over the fact that 
there is anything to think about at all. For we each think from an experiential, 
subjective perspective; reality appears to us from such perspectives and we think 
about it, even if what we think casts doubt on the notion of ‘subjective 
perspective’, exactly because it leans on objective thought. In metaphysics, 
subjective thinking points you in the right direction, then leaves you cold. But 
once you arrive, there is plenty to think about; in the company of all those who 
have been there before and are there now. For it was from this kind of subjective 
perspective that people formed the idea that they were free; that action was 
required of them, and so it was their responsibility to decide and act. It was from 
this perspective that people wondered if their lives had meaning. And it is from 
this perspective that, when we try to make sense of matters like these, we exercise 
our intellectual freedom to think philosophically. 
Thus the great significance of subjective thought, it seems to me, is that it 
brings us to the inside of human life, where philosophical questions arise. We have 
no choice but to think that way when circumstances make subjective thinking the 
only natural kind; but philosophers have chosen to develop it, realising that a 
distinctive set of the questions that we naturally ask depends on it. Physicalism, 
however, wants to close this kind of thinking off, with a metaphysical 
interpretation of the scientific extension of objective thinking. If we had only ever 
thought objectively, somehow oblivious to our subjective perspectives, then it is 
hard to see how we would have ever thought of the traditional problems of 
philosophy. If I thought of myself and others equally objectively, then why would 
I – how could I, even – come to think of these objects as free? Because they do 
unpredictable things, perhaps? (It would be hard to think this in your own case.) 
But then the weather would seem just as ‘free’ as people do. The problem would 
never have arisen.  
And that is very much the point of physicalism, just as it was the point of its 
predecessors in the analytic philosophy movement, namely ideal language 
philosophy, ordinary language philosophy and logical positivism; in each case, it 
was the appearance of genuine philosophical problems that was to be removed 
through analysis. For if we look at the world entirely objectively, as physicalists 
suggest, then there are no philosophical problems; or, if you prefer, the intellectual 
relics we call ‘philosophical problems’ are revealed to be the products of natural 
illusion; relics such as thinking you are free, conscious, and currently at a certain 
stage of your life. You could call the problem of reconciling quantum mechanics 
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with relativity theory a philosophical problem, if you like, but it looks for all the 
world like a scientific problem, and so unless you are prepared to bring in 
illusionary intuitions based on our apparently subjective perspectives – ordinary 
conceptions of time, for instance – then your choice of label is going to look pretty 
dubious. The irony is that physicalism itself, as a metaphysical thesis about the 
fundamental nature of reality, only makes sense in light of subjective perspectives; 
for if the ‘fundamentality’ of the physical particles is not to be contrasted with the 
non-fundamental status of minds, as in the traditional opposition between realism 
and idealism, then it no longer means anything. But again this is very much the 
point of physicalism – not that I think many of its advocates realise – namely to 
take us beyond the urge to philosophically scrutinise the scientific picture, to a 
place where we just trust it. Physicalism aims to lose its own metaphysical status 
and hence itself; it is a bridging device. 
Develop the natural objective and subjective ways we have of thinking about 
the world, then, and the former gets you science while the latter gets you 
philosophy; or at least, that is how it turned out in our world. Subjective thought 
does not negate objective thought, but rather contextualises it. But try to make a 
philosophy out of science, and philosophy is negated. For if we resolve to think 
only like a scientist at work, subjective thought must be intellectually disavowed; 
we must now think only of what the objective picture tells us, and refuse to 
contextualise it within our own individual perspectives. The contextualisation 
provided by subjective thought is vitally important, however; it is not something 
we want to lose, and so physicalism must be resisted with maximum effort. For it 
is within our individual perspectives that the fundamental reality – the only one 
there is – is there to be reflected upon by everyone; disavow those perspectives 
and it becomes an esoteric topic that only scientists can contemplate by means of 
their allegedly beautiful mathematical theories. But natural human questions 
about the meaning of life, or why there is something rather than nothing, are as 
real as they seem to be. Our lives themselves, as we live them from our insider 
perspectives, are as real as they seem to be; not just an illusionary take on 
something radically unfamiliar. Philosophy interprets and elucidates; it should not 
seek to obliterate. When it does, in the shape of physicalism, then its days are 
numbered; one way or the other. 
The contextualisation subjective thought provided me with is that the 
scientific development of objective thought provides a model of how things 
appear within human consciousness, not the final story about how reality is, or 
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even a marker on the road to that final story. To think otherwise, is to try to make 
consciousness disappear, rather than to try to impose some human order upon it 
with objective thought. The recognition of the transcendence of reality is the most 
final story we can have, for when we recognise the limits of both subjective and 
objective thinking – for the former, bare pointing, and for the latter, endlessly 
detailed modelling of the kind of things which could cause what we point to, when 
what we point to is conceived along the original lines of the model – then we are 
able to rationally assure ourselves we should not try to go further. But it does not 
provide closure, only an invitation to think through our place within a reality 
which always outstrips our best descriptive efforts, as part of an ongoing historical 
conversation. Ramberg asks whether, ‘finitude and transcendence are a package 
deal, so that emphasizing one may be a way to illuminate the other’ (p. 140). Yes, 
exactly. 
Now Ramberg pays special attention to my claim that nihilism’s 
consequences ‘outside of philosophy’ are all negative (p. 145). So did two other 
contributors to this symposium, Llanera and Malachowski, and it was the focus 
of one of the reviews of my book, by Hawkins, which I discuss in the Introduction. 
Only Ramberg, however, considers the possibility that the consequences inside 
philosophy might be both positive and practical; this is where his paper gets 
particularly interesting and perceptive, I think. If you think of philosophy as just 
an academic speciality, then the notion of it having practical consequences might 
make you think of its practitioners directly applying themselves to practical 
problems in the world today; this is the ideal of pragmatist philosophy. But my 
emphasis on the naturalness of philosophical questions, and the fact that I led with 
one of the most natural philosophical of all, that of the meaning of life, ought to 
have indicated that I do not.  
Ramberg wonders if, ‘perhaps what we do in philosophy may permeate 
conscious life in such a way that more practical applications of intellect are also 
shaped by it, and not just in an entirely contingent manner’ (p. 146). That is how 
I think philosophy exerts a practical influence; the ‘practical applications of 
intellect’ are not made by professional philosophers, but by people with more 
practical intellects, who have absorbed the prevailing philosophical atmosphere. 
That atmosphere at the moment, at least in the rich, secular world which drives 
social change, is physicalist. We see the effect as people, now used to casually 
relating what their brains make them do, live with only occasional, absent-minded 
curiosity about how the next technological breakthrough will radically transform 
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their lives; hopefully in a manner which will not put them out of a job. The 
philosophy which drives this is invisible, just as it wants to be: it wants us to see 
only science. Natural philosophical questions are thereby discouraged. But if they 
were rather developed, through a change of atmosphere, then we might start to 
see very different practical applications of intellect.   
As Ramberg very neatly puts it, nihilism tells us we cannot have teleological 
closure, and transcendence tells us we cannot have descriptive closure (p. 145). 
And yet religions offer us teleological closure and physicalist philosophy offers 
us descriptive closure; both hoping very much to close each other down through 
our acceptance of their respective offers. If we turn them both down, however, 
and reside somewhere in the middle, with nihilism and transcendence, then we 
may start thinking a little more. For teleological closure is not something we need 
to think through; only accept and live. And neither is descriptive closure; to get 
this, we just need to let the scientists do the thinking for us. Those offering closure 
have no ambition to invigorate public intellectual life by promoting intellectual 
freedom. But philosophy always should. Its traditional ambition is not closure, 
but openness. 
Ramberg finds an anti-authoritarian strand to my thinking which he also finds 
in Rorty. That may well be what attracted me to Rorty in the first place, since I 
liked the fact that he focused on questions concerning the nature of philosophy: 
metaphilosophy. This is certainly an anti-authoritarian preoccupation, liable to 
hold special appeal only to those who are not satisfied to just get on with what 
everyone else is doing at the moment, because they want to question whether 
everyone else is doing the right kind of thing, and to do something different if 
they are not. Rorty certainly wanted to do something different; the figures he felt 
most enthusiasm for within the analytic philosophy happening around him, most 
notably Quine, Sellars and Davidson, were those he was able to read, however 
forcibly, as undermining analytic philosophy. What he really wanted to do, as 
Ramberg says, was to place philosophy in the service of democratic freedom. To 
this effect, he ‘noted the historical transformations of originally liberating notions 
like reason, truth, method, representation, and objectivity into scaffoldings for 
hierarchies and authority structures, and called them out’ (p. 148).  
The problem with his efforts, according to the analysis I share with Ramberg, 
is that once he had divested from philosophy any source of distinctiveness, he had 
no leg to stand on. People listened alright, and they still do; because he became a 
famous intellectual off the back of philosophy. But given his overall message, his 
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support of democratic freedom would have had more intellectual credibility if he 
had not been a philosopher; Chomsky does better because he has scientific 
credentials. Ramberg memorably dubs this predicament, ‘the pragmatic collapse 
of philosophy’ (p. 149). It is an honest predicament if you are a philosophy 
professor who buys all that anti-philosophy stuff but who still wants to make a 
positive difference in the world; and Rorty was nothing if not honest. It is just a 
shame he did buy it. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature had a formative 
influence on me. It seems to take us on a journey to a new and rosier future for 
philosophy, which is what I instinctively wanted. But this is not the destination, 
as you discover in the final chapter. He had a good title, ‘Philosophy without 
Mirrors’, but nothing to back it up; it turns out not to be philosophy at all, but 
rather ‘kibitzing’ between other academic disciplines, the legitimate ones, to keep 
them free of philosophy (Rorty 1979: 393). And to add insult to injury, Rorty tells 
us to embrace physicalism as a kind of Kantian moral choice in that chapter (ibid.: 
382-389); as if to turn away from philosophy and towards science were to do the 
right thing. 
Despite himself, Rorty did have very strong philosophical views: he held that 
there is no objective truth and that everything can be endlessly redescribed. These 
are the philosophical expressions of anti-authoritarianism which he weaved his 
messages about democratic freedom around. The problem is that they are radically 
implausible, and the main reason for this, within our current intellectual climate, 
is the authority science enjoys; which Rorty supported by endorsing physicalism. 
Of course, his own, idiosyncratic brand of physicalism was supposed to be a non-
metaphysical one, compatible with the endless redescription thesis – but note well 
his instincts: if the scientific description has potential to serve authoritarian aims, 
then it must be philosophy’s fault. Not that he was altogether wrong, because 
metaphysical (normal) physicalism is indeed a philosophy. But it is only one kind 
of philosophy. And the big picture Rorty missed is that if philosophy fades from 
our horizons, as he wanted, then the scientific description will not be viewed as 
simply one description among others, but rather as the one which offers closure, 
thereby providing authority to those who yield it. You cannot redescribe scientific 
theories; when postmodernists try, telling us that E=Mc2 is a ‘sexed equation’, to 
take one memorable example, the scientists just have a laugh (see Sokal and 
Bricmont 1999). But philosophy can credibly contextualise the scientific 
description as a whole, by placing it within the context of the experiential 
perspectives from which we live our lives; with our lives on its side, nothing could 
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be more credible. It cannot do this, however, while it is so wracked with self-doubt 
that it turns on its traditional resources in an effort to discredit the natural 
philosophical questions which people instinctively raise; questions those 
resources were built up to service.   
Have I now revealed my central concern in Meaningless? The emphasis I have 
been placing on physicalism more squarely relates to what started to become my 
central concern immediately after I finished that book; my central concern now. 
At the time, I was more concerned to present the metaphysic which had resulted 
from the process of freeing myself from physicalism; and to show the positive 
light in which it places philosophy, against a deafening background of anti-
philosophy. You might say that I was then more concerned with exercising my 
own intellectual freedom, and have since looked outwards, seeing the physicalism 
which once had an irrational hold over me, as the contemporary foundation of 
anti-philosophy; and anti-philosophy not as a challenge to my personal loyalties, 
but rather as a concrete problem for the world within our present circumstances. 
Still, the connection is plain enough, so when I look back over Ramberg’s essay, 
especially in light of his final sentence, I wonder if he has been better able to see 
my central concern than I was at the time.  
When we think of reality as meaningless and transcendent, thereby 
interrupting our more familiar interpretations of it, we are invited to think; if only 
to kick back against the initial thought. When critics of philosophy tell you it never 
makes progress, they reveal their desire for closure. Sure, we do close off some 
problems by solving them, or by realising they were confused. But the real 
progress occurs with the ones worth sticking with; both personally and inter-
generationally. Think of philosophy on the model of science and it looks terrible. 
Think of science on the model of philosophy and it looks terrible too. 
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